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I. THE NEED FOR IMPORT CONTROLS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN
UNITED STATES LAW
The United States includes in its domestic legislation provisions
for the restriction of imports in order to protect the national security.
The following discussion focuses upon section 232 of the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 19621 which has recently been the center of attention in the
petitions for import relief by the Department of Defense for the indus-
trial fastener industry which produces bolts, nuts and large screws for
weapons manufacture and by the National Machine Tool Builders As-
sociation (N.M.T.B.A.). Other provisions for embargoing foreign prod-
1. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 §232, 19 U.S.C. §1862 (1964).
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ucts include section 5 of the Trading with the Enemy Act;2 section 203
of the International Emergency Economic Power Act;3 and section
620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.4 Also, there are some
456 federal regulations governing the interrelationship between trade
policy and national security. Quite a number of agencies are involved.
While the bulk of the regulations overseen by these agencies only
tangentially concern themselves with either trade policy or the national
security, the breadth of administrative involvement sets quite a chal-
lenge for interagency cooperation. A full study is beyond the scope of
the present work, but the interagency cooperation process is touched
upon through an analysis of section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act.
II. THE NEED FOR IMPORT CONTROL PURSUANT TO SECTION 232
OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT
A. Legislative History
Section 232(b) and its legislative history have their genesis in the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955." Speaking of the bill, Sena-
tor Milliken explained the legislative intent as follows:
When [the President] is informed of the possibility that imports
may be threatening that [national] security he . . . would have a
careful study made; and if such threat is found to exist he must act
to limit imports to a degree removing that threat.7
2. Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S. App. §5 (1982).
3. International Emergency Economic Power Act §203, 50 U.S.C. §1702 (1982).
4. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 §620(a), 22 U.S.C. §2371 (1982).
5. Leaving out the agencies of the Department of Commerce and Defense which
receive attention in succeeding sections of this paper, the agencies concerned include:
Office of the Attorney-General; The Department of Energy: Procurement and Assis-
tance; Management Directorate, Economic Regulatory; Administration, Office of the
Secretary, General Energy Regulatory Commission and Conservation and Solar En-
ergy Office; Federal Communications Commission; The Environmental Protection
Agency; The Federal Reserve; The Federal Trade Commission; The Interstate Com-
merce Commission; The Justice Department; The Department of Labor, The Employ-
ment and Training Administration and The Employment Standards Administration;
Office of Management and Budget; National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission; The Office of Personnel Management; The Reg-
ulatory Information Service Center; The Securities and Exchange Commission; The
Department of State; The Internal Revenue Service and Comptroller of the Currency
of the Treasury Department; and The Water Resources Council.
LEXIS Search: ALLREG; National W/2 Security W/25 (Trade or Export) per-
formed on October 11, 1985.
6. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 86, 69 Stat. 166 (1955).
7. 101 CONG. REC. 5299 (1955).
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Senator Milliken believed that when the President could clearly show
that imports were potentially harmful to the national security, a protec-
tive act of import preemption was mandated. The clause was designed
to be preventative rather than curative in nature. Not every American
industry, however, is sufficiently focal to the national security to invoke
this protection. 8 In addition, industries which are efficiently organized
and managed generally do not need protection in competing with
imports.
In order to obtain import protection under this clause, a causal
nexus must be established between the national security and the im-
ports to be investigated. The relationship between these essential ele-
ments must involve a potential harm flowing from the imports to the
national security. The harm need not presently exist. For example,
where defense needs are dependent upon the importation of goods by
sea, and the sealanes are likely to be interdicted by hostile naval forces,
it may be impractical to airlift supplies from overseas. In such a case a
potential remediable harm can be identified if the U.S. Government
has satisfactory grounds for expecting sealanes to be interdicted for a
period longer than it would take to organize and effect an airlift of
supplies. Once the alternatives to an airlift are determined to be im-
practical or likely to be ineffective, avoidance of the harmful effects of
an interdiction of defense supplies is called for. Even if an airlift is
practicable, import relief may be granted so that when an emergency
does occur resources (personnel and material) can be distributed more
efficiently.
When the national security clause was enacted in the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1955, it did no more than constrain the
President's authority to reduce tariffs, "if the President finds that such
reduction would threaten domestic production needed for projected na-
tional defense requirements. '" A year later, the clause was expanded to
allow the President to raise tariffs or impose quotas. At the hearings
before the Senate Finance Committee on the 1955 Bill, Senator
Humphrey succinctly expressed the intent behind that expansion:
I think we should try to maintain in this country the maximum
reasonable practical mobilization base, and that we should protect
that base against destruction from outside, to the extent that it is a
reasonable mobilization base, . . . for the things we need . . . of
vital necessity for us in the event of war.1"
8. BUREAU OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STEEL SUPPLY
AND DEMAND IN THE 1980s, No. 43 (1982).
9. Codified at 19 U.S.C. §1862(a)(1964).
10. Trade Agreements Extension: Hearings on H.R. 1 Before the Senate Finance
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When Congress enacted the national security clause as part of the
1955 trade liberalization laws, it did not consider the protection of do-
mestic industries which are essential to the national security to be in
any way inconsistent with its policy of trade liberalization. Instead,
Congress saw the legislation as a means of actively pursuing both poli-
cies. The Secretary of Commerce observed that "as our [post-World
War II] grant aid to the rest of the world is reduced and ultimately
eliminated, we must increase our imports unless we are willing to see
our exports decrease" and concluded that "we should continue the
trade agreements legislation [for tariff reductions] for the same reason
it was started in the first place, as an import/export-promotion mea-
sure."11 The Secretary of Defense supported the bill on the ground that
an expansion of exports would expand domestic production capacity
and thereby "increase and improve the productive capacity available in
this country ...to meet the needs of an all-out emergency." 12
In the Trade Agreements Extensions Act of 1958,13 Congress
strengthened the national security clause in three ways. First, Congress
broadened its language so that it applied not only to an imported "arti-
cle," but also to "its derivatives," and to permit relief where either the
"quantities" or the "circumstances" of imports threaten to impair the
national security. Secondly, Congress directed the Executive Branch to
consider certain factors when determining whether imports threaten to
impair the national security. These factors broadened the scope of the
clause by employing a definition of national security that expanded
upon the narrower term, "national defense requirements," which was
used in the 1955 provision. These factors are now embodied in subsec-
tion (c) of section 232. Thirdly, Congress granted private parties the
right to petition for relief under the clause and required the Executive
Branch to publish a report in response to each petition. l Senator Byrd
urged adoption of these amendments because they "further strength-
ened [the national security clause] so that sound results may be ex-
pected from it." 15 Congress thus reaffirmed its intention that the na-
tional security clause should play a role in ensuring that both the
nation's defense and trade liberalization goals are pursued
simultaneously.
Comm., 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86 (1955).
11. Trade Agreements Extension: Hearings on H.R. I Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1955) (statement of Sinclair
Weeks) [hereinafter cited as Trade Agreements Hearings].
12. Id. at 188 (statement of Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense).
13. Trade Agreements Extensions Act of 1958, 19 U.S.C. §§1351-1367 (1982).
14. 19 U.S.C. §1862(b),(d). Cf. 15 C.F.R. §§.359.3-.10 (1982).
15. 104 CONG. REC. 13,919 (1958).
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B. Deterrence, Security and Free Trade in the 1980s
Prospects for improved deterrence and international security are
important to an investigation under the national security clause. To the
U.S.S.R., as well as the United States, a strong industrial base which
will support prompt mobilization and sustained military capacity has
substantial value as a tool for diplomacy and as a deterrent to war.1
As conventional wisdom holds, so long as each super-power's defense
planners perceive the other as having the capacity to match any attack,
they will be loathe to recommend engaging the other in battle. Al-
though the content of defense and trade policies has evolved since the
1950s, the same national security clause has continued to provide the
legal crossroads for the two policies. It is not clear, however, that this
crossroads connects necessarily divergent policies. Nor is the national
security clause inconsistent with the view that since World War II, the
world's prosperity, and thus world peace, are likely to be strengthened
by promoting nations' different comparative advantages through free
international trade. Far from being an anomaly, the national security
clause recognizes the limitations that have always attached to that
faith. War can destroy international trade and the prosperity such
trade may bring. In maintaining the requisite national capacity to deter
war, a nation's objective is security and defense, not prosperity. If the
United States did not face the threat of war, and if the United States
and its allies were not threatened by the massively armed Soviet Union,
there would not be justification for the clause.
Alternatively, as the experience of the 1930s showed, peace and
security of all nations are enhanced by an open trading system. To per-
ceive peace and free trade as a trade-off obfuscates the contribution
which free trade makes to world peace. To assume the worst and adopt
beggar-thy-neighbor policies contributes to a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Nevertheless, international relations between nations of diverse politi-
cal, social and economic structures are full of frictions. Defense and
trade cooperation treaties and accords seek to smooth out these fric-
tions while recognizing that policies of self-interest do persist and have
to be accommodated within the international system.
16. Certainly Soviet military experts recognize the strategic importance of the
strength of the United States and its industrial capability. See SOVIET MILITARY
STRATEGY 108-109, 114 (Sokolovskij ed. H.F. Scott trans. 3d ed. 1968); Ogarkov, Na
strazhe mirnogo truda [On guard for peaceful labor], KOMMUNIST, No. 10, July 1981,
at 82-83; Chicherin, 5 Mobilizatsija [Mobilization], 5 SOVETSKAJA VOENNAIA ENT-
SIKLOPEDIJA [Soviet military encyclopedia] 342-44 (1978); Belokonov, Mobilizatsion-
nye vozmozhnosti gusudarstva [Mobilization potential of states], 5 SOVETSKAJA VOEN-
NAIA ENTSIKLOPEDIJA [Soviet military encyclopedia] 340-41 (1978).
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Defense cooperation treaties may be adversely affected by barriers
to trade in items of defense supply. To the extent that the United
States makes valuable use of product innovations developed in allied
nations, trade barriers could well be counterproductive by reducing the
flow into the United States of such products. The imposition of trade
barriers may violate the Memoranda of Understanding between the U.
S. Secretary of Defense and various Western European defense minis-
ters. These memoranda concern reciprocal openness of the United
States and various Western European governments, when procuring
military items, to suppliers from the other signatory nations. Still, they
do not limit in any way the signatories' power to grant trade relief,
especially on the grounds of national security. Specifically, their pur-
pose is:
to make the most rational use of [the signatories'] respective indus-
trial, economic and technological resources, to achieve the greatest
attainable military capability at the lowest possible cost, and to
achieve greater standardization and interoperability of their weap-
ons systems. 17
These memoranda are directed primarily at weapons systems and their
components. Trade barriers in components are likely to hamper the
production of the final product, and thus, defense supply can be
inhibited.
Finally, protection policies lead to trade diversion as the products
formerly exported to the United States are shipped instead to third
markets. The result is that prices are lowered in those markets, and
American exports to those third markets can be displaced. Conse-
quently, the price of protection needs to be carefully measured both in
economic and security terms.
III. G.A.T.T. IMPLICATIONS OF SECTION 232
Section 232 does admit argument to the effect that a nation's right
to act in self-protection can take priority over its commitment to re-
moving artificial trade barriers or maintaining comity and friendly rela-
tions with other nations. Self-protection is a legitimate excuse for ac-
tion which would otherwise be illegal. Still, even if excusable under
article XXI of the G.A.T.T., which excuses certain trade sanctions for
national security reasons, section 232 relief may "nullify or impair" a
17. U.S.A.-U.K. Memorandum of Understanding, Sept. 24, 1975 at 1, 32 C.F.R.
§6-1406.2.
SECTION 232
nation's G.A.T.T. benefits. 8 The United States could be required to
pay compensation or suffer the opprobrium of G.A.T.T.-authorized re-
taliation for erecting trade barriers pursuant to section 232 because a
restriction on imports for security reasons is likely to involve a breach
of the obligation to accord most favored nation treatment.19 It is incor-
rect to suggest, therefore, that implementation of protection pursuant
to section 232 "is not vulnerable to challenge" under the G.A.T.T. 19.1
The domestic law of the United States has taken the G.A.T.T. factor
into account without giving much weight to the consideration of inter-
national reaction to import protection under section 232.20
IV. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES FOR A SECTION 232 INVESTIGATION
The criteria of section 232 are open-ended and broadly defined.
The most elusive definition is the definition of "national security."
Before a threat can be identified and evaluated, the object of the
threat, being the national security, needs to be clearly defined. Only
when the object can be described with some precision can the iterative
process of evaluating the threat in different defense scenarios be kept to
manageable levels. U.S. national security requirements have been bro-
ken into three categories by the Department of Commerce, namely,
"direct defense," (i.e., weapons production) "indirect defense" (i.e.,
supply of inputs to the weapons production process) and "civilian."21
Two key inputs to the analysis are mobilization planning and the Na-
tional Security Directive current at the time of the investigation. They
set the parameters of the "national security" and guide the identifica-
tion of mobilization requirements.22 Within the Directive is a scenario
for National Defense Stockpile Planning. The stockpile is that part of
the mobilization supply which needs to be produced before the emer-
gency arises.
18. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The current version of GATT
is contained in IV GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS; J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of G.A.T.T. 748
(1969). Contra, U.S. Int'l Trade Commission, Foreign Industrial Targeting and Its
Effects on U.S. Industries, Phase I: Japan, U.S.I.T.C. PuB. No. 1437 at 2 (Oct. 1983).
19. See G.A.T.T., supra note 18, at art. I (most favored nation treatment).
19.1 See Knoll, The Impact of Security Concerns Upon International Economic
Law, 11 SYR. J. INT'L L. COMM., 567, 581-610 (1984).
20. U. S. Dep't of Commerce, The Effect of Imports of Nuts, Bolts and Large
Screws on the National Security 57 (Feb. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Department of
Commerce]. But note that no domestic legal authority to pay compensation exists. This
source is available from the author upon request.
21. Id. at ii.
22. Id.
19861
62 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 10
Preparation for an emergency involves both a stockpile of supplies
which can be utilized in the initial stages of meeting the emergency
and a productive capacity capable of generating further supplies neces-
sary to overcome the emergency.
The scenario in the Directive forms the basis for determining de-
fense supply needs as regards particular industries. This is the standard
that reliable emergency supplies must meet regardless of whether the
supplies are domestic or imported. Based on that scenario, the Depart-
ment of Defense (D.O.D.) provides the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (F.E.M.A.) with anticipated defense mobilization expen-
diture levels. From those levels, the F.E.M.A. derives the expected
direct and indirect defense production requirements of certain products
and also estimates civilian demand as constrained by the particular
emergency scenario. The Department of Commerce must fit these
product requirements into an analytical model and calculate the ability
of domestic and foreign producers to continue to provide supplies un-
abated during an emergency either with or without protection pursuant
to section 232.
To summarize the process so far, pursuant to the emergency sce-
nario provided by the National Security Directive, the Department of
Defense decides what funds it expects to make available for a mobiliza-
tion and the F.E.M.A. allocates these expected monies to the three cat-
egories of direct defense, indirect defense and civilian demand. The
F.E.M.A. also defines standards for various product categories which
must be met to achieve the desired mobilization preparedness. Thus,
the demand side of the mobilization market is a function of estimates
made by the D.O.D. and the F.E.M.A. The supply side is analyzed by
the Department of Commerce which, in the course of a section 232
investigation, must determine whether protection from imports could
help reach a level of supply sufficient to meet the demands set by the
D.O.D. and the F.E.M.A.
The involvement of different federal agencies complicates coordi-
nation of this exercise. By virtue of the uncertainties inherent in any
predictive analysis, disagreements will most likely arise with respect to
the assumptions built into the scenarios selected. Crisis modeling is a
task in which the potential for error is large and the consequences of
error can be devastating.
For example, the domestic industry and overseas suppliers may
face cyclical fluctuations in civilian consumer demand. When the econ-
omy is good or improving, demand will be high or rising and the indus-
try economically healthy. When demand declines, producers either
modify their operations, consolidate with other companies or go out of
business. It is, obviously, not easy to calculate at which point in the
business cycle an emergency will arise. It is very conceivable that do-
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mestic producers and overseas suppliers could be facing different levels
of local demand and be at different stages of the business cycle when
an emergency does arise.
In addition, the domestic and overseas industries may specialize in
different segments of the same market. For example, import penetra-
tion in the American industrial fastener market2 s has led to a situation
where foreign firms are supplying smaller diameter standard fasteners
while American companies are providing more specialized, custom tai-
lored products at lower volume, but on a higher profit margin.24 These
market segments may be at different stages of the business cycle when
a crisis arises.
Import penetration coupled with an economic downturn are rele-
vant, but not sufficient elements, for an affirmative determination in a
section 232 petition. International repercussions must be taken into ac-
count, as must the domestic effects of protection."'
The advantage to the protected industry must be weighed against
the costs to purchasers of the industry's products in having to buy the
higher priced local product. In addition, the Department of Commerce
must consider that the misallocation of resources to a relatively ineffi-
cient industry may cause that industry's profitability to depend upon
the protection granted. Since domestic and foreign suppliers can be at
different stages of the business cycle at the time of crisis, it may well
be that the foreign suppliers are, at that time, better geared to provide
the necessary emergency supplies.
So, not only may protection result in a misallocation of resources
generally, thereby encouraging inefficiency, but once imports are ex-
cluded or restricted, the burden lies squarely on the shoulders of do-
mestic producers to be prepared to meet emergency levels of demand
no matter what stage of the business cycle the domestic industry is then
facing.
Protection may itself slow the pace of innovation and reduce the
U.S.'s technological advantage in defense preparedness,2 6 while the
very structure of an industry may be such that subsidization and pro-
motion of innovation will generate a restoration of its economic health
in the absence of protection from import competition.
Relief under the national security clause is not premised upon un-
fair trade practices as in the case of antidumping or countervailing leg-
islation. Moreover, because imports hardly ever dominate the U.S.
23. For a more detailed discussion of the American industrial fastener market, see
infra notes 38-66 and accompanying text.
24. Id. at iii passim.
25. See, e.g., Glass-Lined Chemical Processing Equipment, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,754.
26. The Machine Tool War, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1984 at A18, col. 1.
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market for a commodity, imports will seldom cause a depression in the
business cycle, but they can aggravate a depression or impair a recov-
ery. To this extent at least, it is possible to find that imports threaten to
impair the national security. In such circumstances, an affirmative de-
termination can legitimately be made under section 232.
Another factor to be introduced into and defined for a planning
model is the ability of producers, both at home and abroad, to surge
production. After all, an emergency is inherently unpredictable and
must be met with maximum expedition. If skilled labor and adequate
plant facilities are available, a surge is possible.
As the foregoing discussion is designed to suggest, by altering the
definitions of "national security," "reliable imports" and "domestic ca-
pacity" with or without a surge component, the projected levels of sup-
ply and demand for any or all products in an emergency can be
manipulated to support arguments both for and against import protec-
tion pursuant to section 232. The large number of indeterminate vari-
ables makes any section 232 investigation an exceedingly difficult
exercise.
V. THE PROCESS OF A SECTION 232 INVESTIGATION
The progress of a section 232 investigation is depicted in the fol-
lowing flowchart: 2
7
27. Department of Commerce, supra note 20. As this flow chart indicates, the
first step in an investigation is a format check. Then, various agencies are consulted.
"Short cases" are those that are found to be not worthy of investigation, i.e., where
there is no significant impact on national security. With "emergency cases" and "short
cases," the consultation procedure is by-passed. And in practice, emergency cases gen-
erally proceed under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act rather than
under section 232.
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Industrial Resource Administration-Resource Assessment Division
SECTION 232-ACTION FLOW-CHART REQUEST FOR AN
INVESTIGATION BY:
U.S. GOV'T ENCYRIVATE U.S. DOC
CONSULT WITH DEPT.
OF DEFENSE, F.E.M.A.
AND OTHER AGENCIES
CONSULT WITH H
OTHER AGENCIES
ESTABLISH INTER-AGENCY
WORKING GROUP
ACTION OR INACTION
RECOMMENDATION
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The Department of Commerce has an open-ended discretion to decide
whether to hold public hearings in the course of a section 232 investiga-
tion. 8 Any public hearings that are held do not involve formal plead-
ings and are not subject to the rules of evidence.2 9 Materials submitted
which are classified as sensitive by the government or regarded as con-
fidential by the submitting party are not available for public inspec-
tion."0 The Department is obliged, however, to consult with other de-
partments, especially the Department of Defense.3 1
Taking as a case study the investigation of the industrial fastener
industry, the Department of Commerce: Bureau of Industrial Econom-
ics consulted the Departments of Defense, State, Labor and the Trea-
sury as well as the F.E.M.A., the United States Trade Representative
(U.S.T.R.) and the Council of Economic Advisers. Submissions were
received from the Industrial Fasteners Institute (I.F.I.), the Fasteners
Institute of Japan and Japan Machinery Exporters Association, the
American Association of Exporters and Importers: Industrial Fasteners
Group, Allied International-American Eagle Trading Corporation, an
exporter and importer of industrial fasteners, and Daniel Industries, In-
corporated: Bolt and Nut Division, a domestic producer. Of these, the
first and last submissions argued in favor of protection. The others ar-
gued against protection, primarily on the ground that the upturn in the
business cycle, prevailing in 1982 at the time of the investigation,
would bring the U.S. industry back on an even keel without protection.
In the machine tool industry investigation a year later, a similar
breakdown occurred in the type of submissions received. Responses to
the petition by the National Machine Tool Builders Association
(N.M.T.B.A.) were received from the Machine Tools Importers' Asso-
ciation of America (M.T.I.A.A.), the German Machine Tool Builders'
Association and a joint submission from the Japan Machine Tool
Builders' Association, the Japan Metal Forming Machine Builders' As-
sociation and the Japan Machinery Exporters' Association. Even the
Commission of the European Communities filed comments.
As these case studies suggest, the number and variety of inputs
involved in a typical section 232 investigation require an enormous
amount of time and expense by the parties, as well as the relevant
agencies and departments. Consequently, the applicant U.S. producers,
U.S. importers, foreign producers and the various interested govern-
ment parties generally give a section 232 petition the attention it de-
28. 15 C.F.R. § 359.7(a) (1982).
29. 15 C.F.R. § 359.8(b)(4)(1982).
30. 15 C.F.R. § 359.7.(a) (1982).
31. 15 C.F.R. § 359.7(d)(1982).
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serves. Yet, these investigations are so slow and cumbersome that one
may question whether it is all worthwhile in the end.
VI. SUBSTANTIVE CRITERIA TO BE ADDRESSED IN A SECTION 232
INVESTIGATION
The substantive criteria to be taken into account by both the Sec-
retary of Commerce and the President are illustrated by, but not lim-
ited to:
(1) the domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements;
(2) the domestic capacity available to fulfill these production
requirements;
(3) existing and anticipated availabilities of human resources,
products, raw materials and other supplies and services essen-
tial to fulfilling the projected production requirements;
(4) the needs of defense suppliers to grow and expand the reserves
of resources available for defense supply; and
(5) the impact upon these industries and the U.S. national capac-
ity on the quantity, availability and character of the imports
[under investigation) and, in particular,
(i) the impact upon the economic welfare of individual do-
mestic industries;
(ii) any substantial unemployment;
(iii) the decrease in government revenues;
(iv) decrease in the pool of human skills available to be
tapped;
(v) the weakening in domestic industries' ability to raise fi-
nancing; and
(vi) the displacement of domestic products' market share by
excessive imports. 32
Finally, both the Secretary of Commerce and the President are obliged
to "recognize the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation
to our national security." 33
In April of 1982, the Office of Industrial Resource Administration
confirmed that "[tihe contingency of mobilization will be an important
factor in the consideration of all the criteria listed in [the regulations
32. See generally 15 C.F.R. § 232.
33. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, supra note 1, at §1862(c); see also 15 C.F.R. §
359.4 (1982).
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promulgated under the national security clause] ."3 4
The most recent application of these criteria was in the investiga-
tions concerning the industrial fastener industry and in the petition and
comments concerning the machine tool industry. It is instructive to ob-
serve not only the values attached to these criteria in the course of the
investigations, but also the detailed coverage in the N.M.T.B.A. peti-
tion of the perceived weaknesses in the unsuccessful section 232 action
by the industrial fastener industry.
A. A Profile of the Industries Which Have Petitioned Under
Section 232 (1955-1981)
Between 1955 and 1981, a large number of American industries
applied for and were denied protection on national security grounds.
The products for which protection has been sought are (in chronologi-
cal order):
Fluorspar
Cordage
Stencil Silk
Jewelled Watches
Clinical Fever Thermometers
Analytical Balances
Photograph Shutters
Pin Lever Clocks
Watches and Timers
Wool Textiles
Wool Felt
Wooden Boats
Fine Mesh Wire Cloth
Dental Burs
Heavy Electric Power Equipment
Cobalt
Tungsten
Fluorspar (again)
Steam Turbine Generators
Wool Knit Gloves
Surplus Military Rifles
Transistors and Related Products
All Textiles
Indeed, in 1955, representatives of the petroleum, fluorspar and lead
and zinc industries sought barnacles 5 on the legislation to provide
them with specific legislative protection.36
Positive findings have been made by five Presidents that oil im-
ports threaten to impair the national security.3 7 Oil is the only industry
34. Office of Industrial Resource Administration, U. S. Dep't. of Commerce, EF-
FECT OF IMPORTED ARTICLES ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,692-93
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Office of Industrial Resource Administration] (original
text page numbers cited hereinafter).
35. Industry specific protections are commonly called barnacles.
36. H.R. Rep. No. 50, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1955).
37. President Eisenhower, Proclamation No. 3279, 24 Fed. Reg. 1781 (1959);
President Nixon, Proclamation No. 4210, 38 Fed. Reg. 9645 (1973); President Ford,
Proclamation No. 4341, 40 Fed. Reg. 3964 (1975); President Carter, Proclamation No.
4744, 45 Fed. Reg. 22,864 (1980); President Reagan, Proclamation No. 4907, 47 Fed.
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to have thus far received protection pursuant to section 232.
B. The Case of the Industrial Fastener Industry
The industrial fastener industry produces the bolts, nuts and large
screws required by critical weapons systems, support items and indus-
trial production facilities.3 8 In 1977, the Federal Preparedness Agency
(now the F.E.M.A.) concluded that the domestic supply of metal fas-
teners could not meet national security requirements in an emer-
gency. 39 Its study was conducted at the request of the D.O.D. The re-
port was transmitted to the Treasury Department because, prior to the
1979 amendments to the Trade Expansion Act, section 232 investiga-
tions were conducted by the Secretary of the Treasury. W. Michael
Blumenthal, the then Treasury Secretary, doubted that the use of a
World War II type scenario was an appropriate basis for determining
the U.S.'s emergency needs and suggested that separate analyses of the
markets for "standards" and "specials" (custom made fasteners) ought
to have been included. He recommended no action and the investiga-
tion was terminated.40
On February 11, 1982, Secretary of Defense Weinberger re-
quested a new section 232 investigation.41 Secretary Weinberger opined
that the situation had deteriorated and warned that "we must not be
placed in a sole source foreign dependency situation for mobilization
production needs."' 42 Investigations had also been conducted pursuant
to the escape clause in section 201(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974,43
and for countervailing duties pursuant to section 303 of the Tariff Act
of 1930.44
In June, 1975, the International Trade Commission (I.T.C.)
reached a negative determination against producers who had brought
an escape clause action, but in June, 1977, with the support of organ-
ized labor in the industry, 45 another action was commenced. In that
Reg. 10,607 (1982).
38. Letter from Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to Secretary of Com-
merce Malcolm Baldridge, Jr. (Jan. 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Weinberger Let-
ter]. This source is available from the author upon request.
39. Report of F.P.A., Addendum (April, 1978), Table A-4. This source is availa-
ble from the author upon request.
40. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, (Oct. 18, 1978).
41. 47 Fed. Reg. 13,546 (1982).
42. Weinberger Letter, supra note 38.
43. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1982).
44. Tariff Act of 1930 §303, 46 Stat. 590, as amended 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1958).
45. The United Steelworkers of America and the International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers are the unions prevalent in the industry.
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new action, the I.T.C. recommended relief in the form of higher tariffs,
but the President determined that the recommended relief was not in
the nation's economic interest. Therefore, he ordered an expedited sec-
tion 232 investigation. After the request for relief received the support
of the House Committee on Ways and Means, and the I.T.C. renewed
its affirmative determination, the President increased the tariffs on cer-
tain industrial fasteners by a fifteen percent ad valorem for a three
year period commencing in January, 1979.46 The tariff hike was not
renewed at the end of that period.47
The section 201 and section 232 actions cannot be seen as simulta-
neous yet unrelated. They are grounded in the same facts and are
designed to achieve the same protection from imports. Still, their legal
bases are different. The section 232 investigation is concerned primarily
with potential effects on the national security rather than, as under sec-
tion 201, current, as well as potential, effects on the particular industry.
Yet even in a section 232 investigation, the profitability, productivity
and overall economic structure of the industry are relevant in determin-
ing whether government action is required to repair any deficiency in
the capacity of the industry to meet emergency levels of demand. Un-
like a section 201 investigation, it is not the effect of the presence of
imports in the marketplace which is of concern, but rather their poten-
tial unavailability in an emergency.
In the section 232 investigation of imports of nuts, bolts and large
screws, each of the factors enumerated in section 232(b) was investi-
gated, 4 but three additional matters of specific concern to the indus-
trial fastener industry were also taken into account. First, a distinction
was made between "standards" and "specials." Secretary Blumenthal
had raised this distinction as a ground for recommending no protection
after the previous section 232 investigation concerning this industry.
Second, it was noted that the industry presently imported its steel in-
puts, but that during a mobilization the U.S. steel industry could meet
the total demand. Third, the ability of U.S. machine tool manufactur-
ers to supply the tools needed by the industrial fastener industry was
noted. 4' This last point is ironic because the very next industry to seek
protection under section 232 was the machine tool industry with which
the industrial fastener industry was so interdependent.
In the industrial fasteners investigation, the F.E.M.A. calculated
the direct defense and defense supply requirements for fasteners based
46. Department of Commerce, supra note 20, at Appendix E.
47. Id.
48. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
49. Department of Commerce, supra note 20, at 3-4.
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on mobilization expenditure levels provided by the D.O.D. Projections
for an emergency were based on a classified document entitled "Strate-
gic and Critical Material Stockpile"' 0 and the 1972 Use-and-Make Ta-
bles for the U.S. economy prepared by the Department of Commerce's
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The F.E.M.A.'s estimations called for a
seriously restricted level of civilian consumption. The Bureau of Indus-
trial Economics updated the economic data to June 30, 1982. It also
established an interagency working group for which the following in-
puts were developed:
(1) The D.O.D. provided mobilization expenditure data and informa-
tion on the machine tool reserve and machine tool trigger order
programs.
(2) The F.E.M.A. analyzed final demand expenditure level data and
prepared the estimated mobilization requirements for nuts, bolts
and large screws.
(3) The Department of State analyzed the trade and foreign policy
implications of potential import actions. It also reviewed the relia-
bility of foreign industrial fastener suppliers during the
mobilization.
(4) The Department of Labor identified trends in the number of pro-
duction workers in the fastener industry, their training needs, job
and skill proficiencies, and wage patterns and supplied details of
the availability of workers with special skills from the related in-
dustries. In addition, the Department identified the impact im-
ports have had on employment.
(5) The Treasury Department assessed the effects on the industry of
the President's Economic Recovery Program and other tax
incentives.
(6) The United States Trade Representative (U.S.T.R.) identified va-
rious trade actions which have had and will have a bearing on this
industry.
(7) The Council of Economic Advisers reported on the costs and ben-
efits of import restrictions on industrial fasteners and the impact
on the economy of a significant shift from overseas to domestic
supplies of fasteners. 1
These inputs were then used to extrapolate forward both demand and
supply in the industrial fastener market to the anticipated emergency.
The conclusion was that, during mobilization years, domestic produc-
tion capacity could meet defense requirements but not civilian needs
50. N.S.D. Memorandum 337 of Aug. 23, 1976, referred to in Department of
Commerce, supra note 20, at 5.
51. Department of Commerce, supra note 20, at 6.
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Another factor considered in the investigation was the status of the
skilled labor pool in the industry. Generally, the industrial fastener in-
dustry adjusts to the business cycle by hoarding skilled labor. The nec-
essary skills take three to eight years to attain. The time between eco-
nomic upturns being generally shorter, it makes sense to keep skilled
personnel employed during a downturn rather than to train new people
when the economy recuperates." Although in its investigation the De-
partment of Commerce found the skilled labor pool to be declining in
numbers and the available idle machinery to be over fifteen years old, 5"
the Department found that protection was not necessary to meet na-
tional security needs. 58 Imports from Asia were found to be reliable
and sufficient in quantity to fill the shortfall in local production result-
ing from the declining fortunes of the U.S. industry.
Interestingly, only imports from Europe were considered to be of
doubtful reliability during an emergency. The Bureau considered Japa-
nese imports, which constitute the bulk of U.S. imports, to be "geo-
graphically reliable." 5 Indeed, no more than twenty percent of ship-
ping was expected to be lost in the model utilized." The later
N.M.T.B.A. petition strongly argued that a scenario which considered
imports from Asia to be reliable in an emergency was unrealistic.5 8 The
petition relied on the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Con-
gress for 1984 which suggested that "[tlhe Soviet Union's greatly im-
proved fleet gives it a capacity to conduct an interdiction campaign
against our shipping and naval forces in the Atlantic, Indian Ocean,
and Northern Pacific."'5 9 In addition, the Bureau treated the declining
capacity, falling employment levels and obsolete machinery as symp-
toms of a cyclical downturn only. A surge in domestic production was
built into the emergency projections.
The danger of the Bureau's decision and projections is that if an
enemy such as the U.S.S.R. were to realize the extent of American
reliance on machine tool imports, production facilities in Asia and
Western Europe could become subjects of attack. Japan itself is not
substantially militarized 0 and has no plans to undertake major rearma-
52. Id. at 59.
53. Id.
54. Id. at iv.
55. See note 88 and accompanying text.
56. Department of Commerce, supra note 20, at 62.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 159.
59. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress (1984).
60. See, e.g., Kamikaze Pacifists, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1982, at 12.
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ment.6 1 In a war between the Soviet Union and the N.A.T.O. nations,
therefore, the Soviets could intimidate Japan with the threat of hostile
military action, while at the same time offering to forebear from at-
tacking it on the condition that Japan not use its industrial might to aid
the West. Because Japan has a relatively small defense force, it might
be tempted to accept such an offer in order to protect itself from
attack.
Indeed, in 1982, in the section 232 Investigation of Glass-Lined
Chemical Processing Equipment, the Commerce Department concluded
that: "under a full mobilization condition shipping losses are estimated
to be extensive."62 Yet, this conclusion was not reached in the indus-
trial fasteners case. In fact, the possibility was not even seriously con-
sidered. The complete failure to consider disruptions of imports as a
result of factors other than interdiction on the high seas is a fundamen-
tal defect in the fastener report's approach to import reliability. These
factors are the destruction of ports, airports, internal transportation fa-
cilities and factories by aerial attack or sabotage, the destruction and
loss of access to energy supplies and the use of military force for
intimidation.
Notwithstanding the strong friendship between Japan and the
United States, Japan is seriously underdefended relative to the military
significance of its industrial might. The possible results of such military
weakness are that the Japanese industrial base could be seriously dam-
aged at the outset of a major war, that the Persian Gulf and Indone-
sian sources of Japanese oil supplies could be destroyed, that ships of
such supplies could be interdicted, or that Japan could be intimidated
into a position in which it would be forced to deny its militarily signifi-
cant products to the West and provide them instead to the East. In
spite of these dangers, the I.T.C. anticipated that industrial fastener
imports from Asia would still be reliable during an emergency. Thus,
the imports were found to present no threat to the national security. 3
61. The Washington Post, Dec. 30, 1982, at 15 (quoting senior Japanese Defense
analyst, Tomohisa Sakanaka and other senior government officials); The Washington
Times, Mar. 2, 1982, at 4C (interview with Hon. Yoshio Okawara). See generally,
Defense of Japan: White Paper of the Defense Agency of the Japanese Government
(1980) (translated into English by the Japan Times Ltd.).
62. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,746, 11,953 (1982).
63. Id. In any case, protection may induce a few foreign producers to establish
plants in the United States. This would only occur if such producers viewed the protec-
tion as a long-term phenomenon or if they expected that protection barriers, though
temporary, would recur. Such plants would be easier to safeguard in an emergency by
virtue of being on American soil. Not all the foreign producers shut out of the Ameri-
can market by protection would establish plants in the United States, however, even
assuming that they would continue to be allowed to do so and even though the United
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The analysis of the Council of Economic Advisers appended to the
Department of Commerce report suggested that restriction of imports
would actually be detrimental to the national security.64 Drawing upon
the fact that "in no period of its history, wartime or peacetime, has the
United States ever experienced a prolonged fastener shortage,"6 5 the
Council doubted that there would indeed be a shortfall in production
during an emergency and added:
To the extent that fastener imports are excluded, domestic produc-
ers are encouraged to switch production away from specials used by
the defense industry and into the standards used by the non-defense
sectors. This might weaken U.S. ability to increase arms production
quickly in time of national emergency. There is no justification for
import restriction or tariff relief.66
To the extent that demand for a particular "special" surges during an
emergency, equipment is reset to mass produce that special and the
special effectively becomes a "standard." Yet, whether "special" or
"standard," the overall production capacity of the U.S. industry re-
mains limited. The Council of Economic Advisers appears to have
given little weight to this limit. The limit was considered malleable.
Yet, whether one accepts the Council's analysis or the analysis of the
Department of Commerce, protection from imports pursuant to section
232 would not have been a positive contribution to emergency defense
and defense supply. As is argued above, both analyses were defective
on critical points.
C. The Case of the Machine Tool Industry
The focal nature of machine tools for defense preparedness, unlike
that for many of the earlier national security clause petitions, is beyond
States is the largest single market in the world. Instead, many foreign suppliers would
seek to have their governments negotiate a lowering of the protection barriers. Their
rationale would be that the barriers would effectively separate the largest pool of de-
mand from the most efficient producers leading to a misallocation of international
resources.
64. Department of Commerce, supra note 20, at Appendix I.
65. Id. at 3. The Council concluded that the demand for fasteners is price inelas-
tic. That is, because fasteners are a relatively minor input to the consumer durables for
which they are primarily used and an essential component part, quite a large price
increase for fasteners would have to occur before the demand for them would fall. The
Council also concluded that the supply of fasteners is price elastic, because a small
price increase would lead producers to increase output more than proportionately. See
generally M.T.I.A.A. Petition. This source is available from the author upon request.
66. Department of Commerce, supra note 20, at 5.
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question. In 1948, Congress declared a policy, which continues today,
that: "the future safety and . . . the defense of the United States [re-
quires] a national reserve of machine tools ... for production of critical
items of defense material. '67 In 1955, in supporting the Trade Agree-
ments Extension Act of 1955, the Secretary of Commerce indicated
that he expected the machine tool industry to be helped, not harmed,
by tariff reductions, because he specifically identified machine tools as
an American industry with a large export volume.68 In recent times,
however, the United States has become a major importer of machine
tools. In 1982, the F.E.M.A. recognized the critical importance of the
machine tool industry by singling it out for the reinstitution of a Trig-
ger Order Program. Pursuant to that program, the government planned
during 1983 and 1984 to enter into tentative contracts with approxi-
mately one hundred U.S. machine tool builders for the purchase of
specified types and quantities of machine tools. 9
The Federal Acquisition Regulations70 also operate to protect the
American machine tool industry by listing certain categories of prod-
ucts which the D.O.D. may not purchase overseas.7 1 In addition, gov-
67. National Industrial Reserve Act of 1948 §2, 62 Stat. 1225, codified at 50
U.S.C. §451, as amended. This policy has been honored in the breach for the most
part.
68. Trade Agreements Hearings, supra note 11.
69. F.E.M.A. Forum, Sept. 1982. This source is available from the author upon
request.
70. 48 C.F.R. §§1-49 (1984). This general Federal Acquisition Regulation, effec-
tive as of April 1, 1984, replaced the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) for de-
fense contracts (32 C.F.R. Ch.l §§1-39). The DAR provisions, however, continue to
apply to contracts which preceded the effective date of the FAR.
71. The list is comprehensive and includes the following categories (CCH Govern-
ment Contracts Reports 37,620.18 (1983)):
Federal Supply
Class Number Supply Class Title
3408 Machining Centers and Way-Type Machines
3410 Electrical and Ultrasonic Erosion Machines
3411 Boring Machines
3412 Broaching Machines
3413 Drilling and Tapping Machines
3414 Gear Cutting and Finishing Machines
3415 Grinding Machines
3416 Lathes
3417 Milling Machines
3418 Planers and Shapers
3419 Miscellaneous Machine Tools
3426 Metal Finishing Equipment
3433 Gas Welding, Heat Cutting and Metalising Equipment
3441 Bending and Forming Machines
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ernment policy recognizes that certain high technology machine tools
are so essential for the production of state-of-the-art weapons that it
has forbidden their export to adversaries of the United States.
72
The petition of the N.M.T.B.A. took into account the grounds
upon which protective relief was denied to the industrial fastener indus-
try. The N.M.T.B.A. accepted that it is a small industry producing but
0.12 percent of the U.S. Gross National Product in 1982.73 It argued,
however, that:
machine tools are different from specific end-products used for de-
fense because they are the prerequisite for the production of virtu-
ally all such products and are the cornerstone of the industrial base
supporting our national security.74
In seeking to distinguish its petition from earlier unsuccessful ones, the
N.M.T.B.A. compared the demand under specific military emergency
scenarios with peacetime levels to show that in order to avoid produc-
tion bottlenecks, the industry would need governmental support be-
tween wars. In wartime, total demands on the industry rose sharply to
levels six to eight times higher than peacetime demand, largely as a
result of military needs. The petition asserted that it would be impossi-
ble to maintain peacetime machine tool production at wartime levels
without government intervention.
In addition to arguing that imports from nations other than Can-
ada could not be considered "reliable," the petition claimed that the
effectiveness of the U.S. policy of deterring Soviet aggression depends
upon a Soviet perception that the United States could respond to an act
of aggression both quickly and over a protracted period of time. More-
over, the United States also has to have a sufficient industrial infra-
structure to survive after a war as well as an economy which could
3442 Hydraulic and Pneumatic Presses, Power Driven
3443 Mechanical Presses, Power Driven
3446 Forging Machinery and Hammers
3448 Riveting Machines
3449 Miscellaneous Secondary Metal Forming and Cutting Machines
3460 Machine Tool Accessories
3461 Accessories for Secondary Metalworking Machinery
72. See 15 C.F.R. §399 (1982), based on the Export Administration Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979).
73. Petition for Adjustment of Imports of Machine Tools under the National Se-
curity Clause (Mar. 10, 1983), at 7 [hereinafter cited as N.M.T.B.A. Petition]. This
source is available from the author upon request.
74. Id. at 8.
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subsist during a war.75 The N.M.T.B.A. submitted alternative emer-
gency scenarios, in each of which an affirmative determination for pro-
tection resulted. The petition noted that the government presently relies
on the Machine Tool Reserve, including Plant Equipment Packages,
and the Machine Tool Trigger Order Program to provide machine tools
in the event of a national emergency. 76 A problem with the govern-
ment's policy is that the Machine Tool Reserve comprises seriously ob-
solete equipment, much of which is inoperable.77 In addition, the Trig-
ger Order Program assumes that there are healthy American machine
tool builders available to respond to the trigger orders when they come.
The program does not underwrite the American machine tool industry
or maintain its strength or existing production capacity.
The government's position during the Korean War clearly showed
that this policy was weak and ineffectual. At the outbreak of the Ko-
rean War in 1950, a potential problem of machine tool supply was not
anticipated by civilian or military leaders.78 The government readily
concluded that it had ample machine tools on hand for the limited war
effort and needed relatively little new production. It had in storage
more than 80,000 idle machine tools, most of which were less than ten
years old. There were also "several hundred Government-owned stand-
by plants, many equipped with [machine] tools," and "thousands of
tools standing idle in used and reconditioned dealers' hands;" and civil-
ian industries had "not only become 'tooled-up' to the teeth for World
War II but... had absorbed thousands upon thousands of surplus tools
after the war."17 9
By early 1952, "over 80 percent of the Air Force's reserves and
over half of the Army reserve in storage at the time of Korea [had]
been released for defense production."80 But the government planners
had erred fundamentally in failing to take account of the obsolescence
of even the relatively new tools in the reserve. "[T]he new jet engines,
guided missiles, and atomic weapons, to mention a few, require not
only the very latest in scientifically designed tools, but in some cases
the design of entirely new tools." 8' As a result, "[b]y October 1951 the
75. See J.S. GANSLER, THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 123 (1980); The Washington Post,
Nov. 10, 1982, at A24, col. 1.
76. N.M.T.B.A. Petition, supra note 73, at 177.
77. J.S. GANSLER, supra note 75, at 113-14.
78. Defense Production Act, Progress Report No. 13, Machine Tools, U.S. Con-
gress, Joint Comm. on Defense Production, S.Rep. No. 207, 82 Cong. 2d Sess. 1, 2
(1952).
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id. at 50.
81. Id. at 9.
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unfilled backlogs [for machine tools] had increased to 24 months in
spite of the substantial jump in monthly deliveries, ' 82 and "machine
tools [were] classed as the no. 1 bottleneck" in the nation's mobiliza-
tion effort.83
On the problem of the industry's capacity to surge production in
an emergency, the N.M.T.B.A. petition included projections prepared
for the petition by Data Resources, Incorporated for both a limited Vi-
etnam-style war scenario and a protracted conventional war scenario .
4
The projections assumed that the devastation resulting from a nuclear
confrontation between superpowers would render any preparations for a
nuclear war useless. Therefore, the arguments were not premised upon
a nuclear war scenario.
In the limited war scenario of four years duration, U.S. producers
would only be able to meet military demand with long delays in supply.
The large-scale conventional war scenario was also projected to last
four years and similarly showed a negative gap between defense needs
and supply. Importantly, the model assumed that imports would con-
tinue to be available during peacetime, but would be interdicted early
by the enemy in either war scenario. Therefore, no imports were con-
sidered to be reliable in an emergency. This definition of reliable im-
ports, which was different from the Defense Department's definition,
made the claim for protection from imports a more arguable position.
A serious national security emergency in the future would argua-
bly require the production of far more armaments and at a faster rate
than the Korean conflict required. The fact that a serious machine tool
bottleneck developed during the Korean War notwithstanding the
availability of a much more substantial machine tool stockpile than
currently exists indicates how ineffective the small, obsolete and deteri-
orated stockpile presently on hand would be in a serious future national
security emergency.
The petition also noted that with respect to machine tools, the like-
lihood that Japanese producers would establish plants in the United
States if imports were sharply restricted is not high.
Currently, only one Japanese builder has a plant for full-time pro-
duction [i.e., Yamazaki Machinery Works, Ltd., which [began]
production of primarily American-made machines in 1984], two
others have assembly lines, and a couple more extend production
licenses to U.S. firms .... Japanese plants in the U.S. are unlikely
82. Id. at 29.
83. Id. at 80.
84. N.M.T.B.A. Petition, supra note 73.
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to sprout quickly, although the idea is rapidly growing popular as
an alternative to the current import control debate.8"
In order to avoid future bottlenecks, the N.M.T.B.A. pressed strongly
for protection barriers behind which the ailing U.S. industry could revi-
talize itself.
The framers of section 232 would hardly have expected the ma-
chine tool industry to be a major applicant for relief and the
M.T.I.A.A. argued that the N.M.T.B.A. petition should be treated
with surprise and even suspicion. If, however, today, from a Commerce
Department perspective, importing machine tools was congruent with
both U.S. trade policy and national security concerns, the N.M.T.B.A.
petition would not have succeeded as it did in convincing Secretary
Baldridge.
The comments of the M.T.I.A.A. to the N.M.T.B.A. petition chal-
lenged the assumptions upon which the petition was based. The
M.T.I.A.A. argued that not all imports would be interdicted during an
emergency, that civilian consumption could be cut to levels below those
built into the scenarios posited by the N.M.T.B.A., and that American
manufacturers could surge production more than the N.M.T.B.A.
estimated.
In essence, the importers (the M.T.I.A.A.) relied upon the defini-
tional assumptions and value judgments in the negative determination
reached with respect to the industrial fastener industry. Both the indus-
trial fastener and machine tool industries in the United States faced
declining labor and capital resources. Both were losing their market
share to imports in the context of a severe cyclical downswing in Amer-
ican demand. An upswing in demand for consumer durables would re-
store the health of both industries as the demand for industrial fasten-
ers and machine tools depended on demand for those durables. In the
face of such argument, it becomes clear that even given the adverse
economic effects of imports in the United States, which are apparent in
both cases, the claim for protection pursuant to section 232 turned
upon the definitional assumption of import reliability and the ultimate
emergency scenario utilized.
In February, 1984, Secretary of Commerce Baldridge recom-
mended relief in the section 232 petition of the N.M.T.B.A. In light of
that recommendation, the President's primary options were to award
relief, perhaps different to that petitioned for, or reject relief on the
ground that the premises of the N.M.T.B.A. petition, especially the
emergency scenarios utilized, were incorrect. The least politically
85. AMERICAN METAL MARKET, July 11, 1983, at 3A.
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favorable alternative would have been to conclude that the Secretary of
Commerce ought not to have been convinced by the petition regardless
of the correctness of its premises. Rather than immediately adopt one
of those choices, the President called for revision of the conventional
war scenario without also rejecting the petition.86 As of June 1st, 1986
the matter remains unresolved. But, given the closeness in time of the
two cases and the fact that this case was not summarily rejected, the
N.M.T.B.A. clearly had succeeded in distinguishing and distancing
themselves from the unsuccessful action on behalf of the industrial
fastener industry. In addition, the long delay between Secretary Bal-
dridge's affirmative recommendation and the yet to be released deter-
mination of President Reagan reflects the sensitive nature of the deci-
sion. Meanwhile, many American machine-tool manufacturers have
taken to importing foreign machine tools to add to their supply
capability.8 7
VII. REMEDY OPTIONS UNDER SECTION 232
Although no protection was recommended in the industrial fast-
ener investigation, a number of remedy options were canvassed by the
industrial fastener industry in its submission on the case. These options
were:
(1) stockpiling of products or productive machinery;
(2) investment allowances and subsidies;
(3) tariffs;
(4) quotas, Voluntary Restraint Agreements or Orderly Marketing
Arrangements;
(5) a Defense Department "Buy American" program;
(6) legislation against "downstream dumping"; and
(7) combinations of the above.88
The I.F.I. submitted that the remedy adopted be simple, convinc-
ing to the electorate, easily administered, effective, appropriate and
temporary.8 9 It called for "breathing room" in which "permanent self-
sufficiency at an acceptable level of capacity" could be attained.9"
The selection of available remedies, however, does not give suffi-
cient weight to the caution issued by the U. S. Supreme Court in FEA
86. 9 ITIM 782 (Mar. 21, 1984); Mann, Tool Import Relief Appeal Returned for
More Study, AVIATION WEEK and SPACE TECH. 93 (Apr. 9, 1984).
87. Protectionism Threatens Profits, ECONOMIST 67 (Jan. 26, 1985).
88. Department of Commerce, supra note 20, at 37.
89. Id. at 30-37.
90. Id. at 36.
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v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,"' in upholding the imposition of a license fee
in lieu of quotas to adjust imports to protect the national security. The
court warned that "our conclusion ...in no way compels the further
conclusion that any action the President might take, as long as it has
even a remote impact on imports is also so authorized."' 92 Indeed, in
Independent Gasoline Marketers Council v. Duncan,93 an "import fee"
on oil imports was struck down because it did not discriminate effec-
tively against imported oils in favor of the domestic product.94 The
court viewed unfavorably demand-side incentives as section 232 reme-
dies. In light of these two cases, the stockpiling, subsidy and "Buy
American" remedies suggested above are of doubtful legal validity as
remedies under section 232.
In addition to the question of the legal validity of the remedy se-
lected, the fiscal and political costs and benefits of the remedy options
must be taken into consideration. Following the unsuccessful section
232 action by ferroalloy producers immediately preceding the industrial
fasteners investigation, for example, stockpiling of ferroalloys began."5
The two cases are distinguishable, however, because it is practical to
stockpile material inputs whereas obsolescence is likely to reduce the
effectiveness of stockpiling a manufactured product. Therefore, stock-
piling could be but a short term palliative in the industrial fastener and
machine tool industries.
Investment assistance is hard to reconcile with the government's
overall policy of fiscal restraint, but if properly administered, such re-
straint would be effective to restore the industry's economic health.
A separate source of Presidential authority to' grant a remedy,
which does not depend on any finding by the Department of Com-
merce, is Title III of the Defense Production Act of 1950."1 This Act
permits the President to make loans to businesses and non-profit re-
search corporations for the expansion of capacity for research and de-
velopment, provided that financial assistance is "not otherwise available
91. FEA v. Algonquin, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976).
92. Id. at 571.
93. Independent Gasoline Marketers Council v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614
(D.D.C. 1980); accord, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v.
Freeman, 510 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1981).
94. Council v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. at 618; Bruff, Judicial Review and the Presi-
dent's Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REV. 2, 53-55 (1982). When the Government ap-
pealed, Congress legislated repeal of President Carter's program, overriding a Presiden-
tial veto en route. 126 CONG. REc. 6376-87 (daily ed. June 6, 1980) and 126 CONG.
REC. H4600-02 (daily ed. June 5, 1980).
95. See generally 7 ITIM 334 (Dec. 8, 1982).
96. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S. App. §§2091-2098 (1982).
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on reasonable terms."97 The loans can also be used to "purchase met-
als, minerals, and other materials, for Government use or resale" at
prevailing market prices, in order to "assist in carrying out the objec-
tives of [the] Act," 8 and to "install government-owned equipment in
plants, factories, and other industrial facilities owned by private per-
sons" when "in [the President's] judgment it will aid the national de-
fense." 99 As a practical matter, however, this authority is limited by
the relatively meager appropriations made for its exercise. Thus, if the
appropriations were more realistic, the program could conceivably go a
long way in improving a petitioning industry's well-being.
The I.F.I. also recommended that the government adopt a "Buy
American" program, plus import quotas or a Voluntary Restraint
Agreement or Orderly Marketing Arrangement, and vigilance against
"downstream dumping." The fiscal implications of "Buy American"
programs are that the U.S. government will be spending more than it
otherwise would to buy the relatively more expensive local product. The
quota proposed was to vary with mobilization requirements operative
from time to time. One problem with imposing a special tariff needed
to protect a defense supply industry is that the level of tariff needed to
deter unwelcome imports effectively may be very high. In the industrial
fastener industry, the tariff would need to be over forty percent for
some products since price disparities between domestic and imported
items are due primarily to disparities in the cost of steel;100 a disparity
which in many cases would require unrealistic tariff amounts. There is
no guarantee that tariffs will restore the desired productive capacity,
because there is no direct linkage between increased tariffs and a re-
duction in import penetration. Overall, tariffs involve unwelcome
G.A.T.T. implications and provide no guarantee that the industry
would develop its productive capacity rather than rely on the tariff to
continue securing a minimum market share for the local industry.
Perhaps more importantly, tariffs impact not just upon the defense
supply, but the civilian welfare too. For example, the same bolt re-
quired for tank assemblies may also be required for snowmobiles.
While only one end product is critical, if the bolts are identical, there is
no way of limiting relief to cases in which the bolt is necessary to the
97. 50 U.S.C. App. §2092 (Supp. V. 1981).
98. 50 U.S.C. App. §2093(a) (Supp. V. 1981).
99. 50 U.S.C. App. §2093(e) (1976).
100. See the earlier case of Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Dep't of
Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles, 80 Cal.Rep. 800, 276 Cal.App.2d 221
(1969), where the problem of disparate steel prices was sought to be remedied by a
Californian "Buy American" Statute, accord, Zee Toys, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles,
149 Cal.Rptr. 750, 85 Cal.App.3d 763 (1978), affd, 449 U.S. 1119 (1981).
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national defense. Clearly, for a remedy to be as effective as possible
without serious negative side effects, it would need to impact upon the
defense demand, but not the civilian demand for the product.
The I.F.I. argued that the obvious first step for relief is for the
government to reform its own procurement practices so as to require
that U.S. contractors and subcontractors utilize only nuts, bolts and
large screws produced in the United States and Canada.
If the conventional wisdom in classical international law that
states have an unfettered discretion to determine their national security
needs and to act in accordance with that determination is accepted,
then the use of the government's procurement power in this way is con-
sistent with U.S. obligations under both bilateral and multilateral trea-
ties since those agreements contain exceptions for, and can even be seen
as subject to, the primacy of national security requirements. 10 1 In view
of the U.S.'s opposition to the Japanese government's procurement pol-
icy for its telecommunications monopoly (N.T.T.), however, Japan and
other supply sources would certainly view any "Buy American" pro-
gram unfavorably.
Another remedy proposed by the I.F.I. was a floating quota which
could be adjusted periodically based on a minimum installed, mobiliza-
tion-available production capability. Essentially, this remedy was a
novel twist to the ill-fated trigger price mechanism (T.P.M.) for impos-
ing anti-dumping duties on steel imports. The quota would be equal to
the apparent domestic market for nuts, bolts and large screws, less "do-
mestic adjusted production" where such production is the specified na-
tional security requirement and less an appropriate surge capacity. It
would float in a way that would ensure a minimum installed domestic
manufacturing capacity necessary to meet changing conditions both in
the specified national security requirements and the apparent market
shares. Under this formula, the size of the quota is set by the specified
national security need, which in turn represents the target level of es-
sential domestic capacity which the quota is intended to provide. In-
stead of establishing a floor price which guarantees the local industry a
fair opportunity to compete, the suggested mechanism guarantees a
minimum market share. It does not promote efficiency among local pro-
ducers, because they do not have to meet foreign competition in order
to make sales. In this respect, the floating quota is inferior to a T.P.M.
A national security import quota would also need to alleviate the
industry's raw materials problems. At the present time, foreign steel
sold overseas is considerably cheaper than domestic steel, primarily be-
101. N.M.T.B.A. Petition, supra note 73, at 43. See also Bethlehem Steel, 80
Cal.Rep. 800. See generally, Knoll, supra note 19.1, at 567.
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cause there are no efficient domestic production facilities for fastener
wire rod. 102 A quota could demonstrate to domestic steel producers that
fastener wire rod is a worthwhile market in contrast to the past, and
this could arguably stimulate investment in modern "mini mills" for
wire rod production. It is hoped that efficient facilities could compete
with foreign steel producers in offering fastener manufacturers wire rod
at the lower world prices.
Steel is cheaper overseas than in the United States, but imports of
steel into the United States are restricted. Although labor costs in
much of the American manufacturing industry are high by world stan-
dards, in the industrial fastener industry they are at least comparable
to labor costs in Japan, the main source of fastener imports to the
United States. Foreign steel exporters avoid American steel import re-
strictions by first using the steel to produce goods, such as fasteners,
and then exporting those goods to the United States. These goods face
lower protection walls than steel and the converted steel sells at higher
quantities in the United States than would be the case if unconverted
steel were being sold.
Where the steel is being sold to producers of exports at a lower
price than to producers of non-exported products, the converted steel in
the form of fasteners, for example, is being sold at "Less Than Fair
Value." The problem of "downstream dumping" has been addressed
only recently in pending legislation. 10 3
Unlike the I.F.I. petition, the petition of the N.M.T.B.A. did not
offer remedy options, but simply pressed for a protective quota limiting
imports to a seventeen and one-half percent market share. The U.S.
National Academy of Sciences recommended subsidization of research
and development in defense related technologies as a better way to en-
sure secure supplies of the best equipment. 104 The argument lay essen-
tially between a quota which protected the market share of American
producers with respect to both defense related and civilian demand and
a promotion of only defense related technologies." 5
Nevertheless, subsidies and investment allowances designed to re-
store the industry's international competitiveness would alleviate cause
rather than symptom. Ironically, because subsidies do not discriminate
102. Foreign steel sold in the United States is sold at roughly the price of domes-
tic steel due to the residual effects of the T.P.M.
103. H.R. 4784, The Trade Remedies Reform Act, 1984. Cf., S. 2497, Omnibus
Trade Act of 1982.
104. The Machine Tool War, supra note 26.
105. Because of the accelerating rate at which machine tools become obsolete,
stockpiling was not and is not a remedy for the problems of the machine tool industry.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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against imports and are therefore unlikely to be a valid remedy under
section 232, this alternative was not canvassed by the N.M.T.B.A.
The N.M.T.B.A. criticized the existing Trigger Order Program,
but did not suggest its improvement as a satisfactory remedy for their
ills." 6 That program's expenditure level is projected to only sixty per-
cent of defense needs during the Korean War. In other words, it does
not anticipate a major military conflict.
In support of the requested remedy of a quota, the N.M.T.B.A.
argued that demand would not fall and that the higher priced.Ameri-
can product would sell in sufficient volume to permit the industry to re-
emerge at the technological and productive forefront of the interna-
tional machine tool market. The industry offered to accompany the
quota with a commitment to self-help in order to achieve this goal. The
record of American machine tool producers in innovation, however,
does not disclose a readiness to invest and respond to market pres-
sures. 0 7 In the past, inefficiencies due to continuing reliance on out-
dated production processes led to order backlogs, causing customers to
turn to quicker overseas suppliers." 8 Removal of the imports may bring
customers back to the American producers, but would not of itself lead
to an improvement in the quality of both the American product and the
accompanying services. Nevertheless, a temporary protection wall
would help to ease in the process of structural realignment, during
which time the industry could reorganize itself into firms of economic
scale utilizing up-to-date technologies. In the N.M.T.B.A. petition, 0 9
the industry impliedly offered to make such positive use of the respite
offered by temporary protection.
VIII. SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SECTION 232
Following the decision in FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.," 0 section
232 allows for only those remedies which impact directly upon imports.
Particularly, where component rather than ultimate products are in-
106. N.M.T.B.A. Petition, supra note 73, at 184-87.
107. Machine Tools: Will the Cornerstone Erode?, INDUSTRY WEEK, Apr. 30,
1984, at 63-78 [hereinafter cited as Industry Week]; J.S. GUENTHER, SELECTED EF-
FECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM ON THE MACHINE
TOOL INDUSTRY (Cong. Research Service, Library of Congress, 1981) CRS-10; NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING/NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE COMPETI-
TIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY (1983).
108. Industry Week, supra note 107; J.S. GUENTHER, supra note 107, at CRS-Il;
NATIONAL ACADEMY, supra note 107, at 43.
109. And the supplementary petition filed in response to the submission by the
Japanese and German producers and their importers.
110. FEA v. Algonquin, 426 U.S. 548.
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volved, fashioning a legally valid remedy which minimizes the effect of
import restrictions on civilian demand while protecting the national se-
curity is a hurdle yet to be overcome. Yet once a petition has received
the nod of the Secretary of Commerce, as in the case of the
N.M.T.B.A., it is difficult to deny relief from imports without, as it
were, altering the rules of the game after the fact. At the same time,
keeping those rules up-to-date, in particular the mobilization scenarios
used to define what is "the national security," is an important prerequi-
site to identifying the needs of defense suppliers for government inter-
vention, regardless of whether that intervention is in the form of pro-
tection from imports.
By the time the difficult definitional issues are clarified and the
wide array of relevant criteria identified and adequately analyzed, the
risk of the initial premise of the industry's indispensability to national
security becoming obsolete in the face of accelerating technological
changes is high. Whether or not the U.S. government considers imports
to be as reliable in an emergency as domestic supply where the sensi-
tive question of national security is involved, defense preparedness
would seem to require that attention be concentrated on the quality of
the product. Encouraging technological innovation throughout the
Western world would seem to assure security better than entering into
demarcation disputes as to the sources of current and future supplies.
Even though the N.M.T.B.A. petition has continued to receive support
from those like Senator John Heinz who views import relief as essential
to saving a vital defense supply industry,"1 it is at least as important to
recognize that section 232 encourages attention to symptom rather
than cause. Its operation is expensive in both time and money terms,1"
its processes arduous, and its benefits, given the overwhelming number
of negative determinations, are questionable. The foregoing analysis
has sought to highlight some of the challenges facing any section 232
investigation by focusing on two recent strongly presented claims for
relief.
A persuasive case can be made for a policy of trade liberalization
with the confluent goal of international peace and security. The alter-
native of pursuing primarily national security supported by barriers to
international trade has been tried before.113 Independent rather than
111. 2 Int'l Trade Rep. 1050 (Aug. 21, 1985); Wright, Foley, and Dingell (May 4,
1984) (discussing U.S. House Democrats' request for machine tool import curb) (cited
by Kyodo News Service May 5, 1984); PTO Letter from Senator Dole to New York
Times, (Apr. 25, 1984), N.Y. Times, May 6, 1984, at A31, col. 4.
112. This is so notwithstanding Trade Remedy Assistance Office aid to small busi-
nesses filing petitions for relief. 19 U.S.C. §1339, Pub. L. No. 98-573.
113. See, e.g., Smoot-Hawley, (Tariff) Act of 1930, Pub.L. No. 11-361, 46 Stat. 590
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interdependent trade and security policies designed to deter aggression
have given rise to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Seen in this light, the reluc-
tance of the Administration to grant relief under section 232 has been
a courageous contribution to an open and secure trading system. Unless
this commitment is reversed, the continuing need for section 232 is
surely doubtful.
IX. POSTSCRIPT
As of June 1, 1986, the section 232 N.M.T.B.A. petition remains
in limbo. During the Lybian crisis, President Reagan reportedly found
time to discuss the issue with representatives of the Department of
Commerce, the National Security Council, and the Department of De-
fense."' In the three years since the petition was filed, so much has
changed in the machine tool industry that presidential action at this
point would bear little relation to the facts pertaining three years ago.
A number of American machine tool producers have closed their
plants. Following the 30% rise in the value of the yen against the U.S.
dollar, Japanese standard machine tool prices have risen 7% to 12%
with further rises expected. In addition to this price realignment, some
U.S. machine tool producers have taken the bit between the teeth and
have become more competitive. For exaqmple, Kearney & Trecker
Corporation of Milwaukee has cut prices on some machining centers by
26%.115
In Washington, pressure has mounted for White House attention
to the plight of the machine tool builders. In a letter sent to the Presi-
dent on January 31, 1986, twenty-seven Republican Congresspersons,
including Bob Michel from Illinois and Nancy Johnson from Connecti-
cut, expressed strong support for the N.M.T.B.A. petition. 1 The letter
states that the machine tool industry was losing both skills and capacity
and that such skills and capacity were essential to the technological
edge of American weapons systems.1 17
Encouraged by these events, the industrial fastener industry,
whose earlier section 232 petition was unsuccessful, has sought to reo-
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 19 and 28 U.S.C.).
114. Rohan, A Gyrating Industry: Prices, Systems, Shows, INDUSTRY WEEK,
Apr. 14, 1986, at 25.
115. Id.
116. See, Congressmen Seek Measures Against Machine Tool Imports, Jiji Press
Ticker Service, Feb. 12, 1986.
117. Id.; See also, Machine Tool Case Gaining Renewed White House Attention
Amid Congressional Push for Action, Daily Report for Executives (BNA), at L-I
(Feb. 5, 1986).
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pen its case. 18
It is unsurprising that the machine tool builders and the industrial
fastener industry have now focused their attentions on the political
rather than the legal avenues open to them for import relief. As was
concluded when this article was first written, the long, arduous and
misdirected procedures of a section 232 investigation offer little benefit
to petitioning industries and to the U.S. Government seeking to pursue
both national security and trade liberalization goals. Until such time as
the United States develops a workable definition of its national security
needs, no reasonable or predictable procedure for national security-
based import protection can be developed. So long as the essential is-
sues remain unresolved, the best the United States can hope for is that
somehow it might just muddle through.
118. Action Goal: Congressional Hearing Justified. Proposal: Reexamine Com-
merce Department Section 232 Fastener Investigation: An Open Letter to Casper
Weinberger, FASTENER TECH., Feb. 1986, at 6.
